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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

TWO MORE YEARS OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
By
FRnE

BLANTON*

Some two years ago in this Law Feview1 a survey of cases arising for approximately the first two years under the Federal Tort Claims Act2 was undertaken.
Therein was discussed som'e of the principal problems which had been presented
to and adjudicated by the courts in the administration of this important legislation.
Since that time the Supreme Court has had occasion to resolve some of the
then existing conflicts of statutory construction; others which had been but briefly considered have received a futiler consideration by the lower federal courts;
and there are quite a few new ones worthy of discussion. As was the purpose
in that earlier article, this one proposes simply to treat what has happened
in the courts 3 and to briefly evaluate the results reached. To some future article
or articles necessarily must be postponed the task of a fuller and more detailed
analysis of any particular problem. In general, the same pattern of presentation
employed then will be followed now.
Statute of Limitation and Related Problems

The original language of the Act provided for a one year statute of limitation
5
in tort claims against the United States. 4 This provision created some difficulty,
*A.B. Birmingham-Southern College, 1939; LL.B. University of Virginia, 1942. Assistant
Professor Of Law, Department of Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Member
of the American, Alabama and Birmingham Bar Associations.
I Blanton, The Federal Tort Claims Act in Action, 53 DICK, L. REv. 163-176 (1949).
2 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1950),
8 Cases are included which have been published in the reporter system through 71 S. Ct. 507
(1951) of 15 March 1951; 186 F.2d 1023 (1951) of 19 March 1951; and 81 F. Supp. 518 (1951)
of 19 March 1951. On occasion reference will be made, of necessity, to some cases covered in the
previous article.
Some of the cases reported are simply factual ones applying the applicable state law as contemplated by the Act, and hence will receive no mention other than an inclusion in this footnote.
These are Macchiarella v. U.S., 95 F. Supp. 149 (D. C. Fla. 1951), Roserre v. U. S., 94 F. Supp.
1004 (D.,C. Pa. 1951), Smith v. U. S., 49 F. Supp. 681 (D.C.N.C. 1950); Rutherford v. U. S.,
93 F. Supp 772 (D. C. Wyoming 1950), Sams v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 415 (D. C. Pa. 1950),
Tucker v. U. S., 91 F. Supp. 527 (D. C. Alaska 1950), Watson v. U. S., 90 F. Supp. 900 (D. C.
Alaska 1950), Barton v. U. S., 90 F. Supp. 957 (D. C. Ala. 1950), Patrick v. U. S., 90 F. Supp. 340
(D. C. Cal. 1950), Elgin v. U. S., 89 F. Supp. 195 (0. C. Mo. 1950), Lem v. U. S., 89 F. Supp. 914
(D.C.D.C. 1950), Clemens v. U. S., 88 F. Supp. 971 (D. C. Minn. 1950), Wibyc v. U. S., 87
F. Supp. 830 (D. C. Cal. 1949), Parslow v. U. S. 87 F. Supp. 259 (D. C. N. Y. 1949), Brown
v. U. S., 87 F. Supp. 99 (D. C. S. C. 1949), Carroll v. U. S., 87 F. Supp. 721 (D. C. S.
C. 1949), Florida v. U. S., 85 F. Supp. 489 (D. C. Fla. 1949), Christie Scow Corp. v. U. S., 85
F Supp. 584. (D. C. N. Y. 1948). Schmidt v. U. S., 84 F. Supp. 496 (D. C. Kans. 1949), Creal v.
U. S., 84 F Supp. 249 (D. C. Ky. 1949), Gibson v. U. S., Ronk v. U. S., White v. U. S., 83 F.
Supp. 990 (D. C. W. Va. 1949), Washabaugh v. U. S., 83 F. Supp. 623 (D. C. Pa. 1949), Brouse
v. U. S., Townsend v. U. S., 83 F. Supp. 373 (D. C. Ohio 1949), Visokay v. U. S., 83 F. Supp.
367 (D. C. Pa. 1949), Lowe v U. S., 83 F. Supp. 128 (D. C. Mo. 1949), Beasley v. U. S., 81
F. Supp. 518 (D. C. S. C. 1948).
4 "A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless action is begun thereon
within one year after such claim accrues * * *" 28 U. S. C. A. § 2401(c) (1948).
6 Burkhardt v. U. S., 165 F.2d 869 (1947), overruling 70 F. Supp. 982. (D. C. Md. 1947).
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but what difficulty there was vanished with the passage of time. However, on April
25, 1949, the earlier language of limitation was changed by the Congress to
read as follows:
"A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless action is begun thereon within two years after such claim accrues,
or within one year after the date of the enactment of this amendatory
sentence, whichever is later ' * *"6
Two questions of interpretation have arisen in connection with this provision.
One has to do with a state statute of limitation operating on the right and
not the remedy, or, in other words, a state statute of limitation construed as
substantive as contrasted with one denominated by the state court as procedure.
The other required a determination as to whether between 26 April 1949, and
25 April 1950, inclusive, a civil action could be filed on a claim accruing after
1 January 19457 where the former one year statute of limitation had run. This
latter problem was eliminated by the expiration of one year after the amendatory sentence became law, and will be disposed of briefly before consideration
of the more pertinent conflict between state statutes of limitation construed as
substantive and the federal statute of limitation set forth previously.
Admittedly, by the very provisions of the Act, the claim must have accrued
after 1 January 1945 and the court has no jurisdiction over claims which matured
prior to that date.8 Even though the particular claim sued on is deemed to have
accrued after this date by an application of state law, as in the situation where
a claim for indemnity accrues on payment to the one injured, this claim is not
enforceable if the injury which has been compensated for occurred prior to the
1 January 1945 date.9 The rational'e of such a result recognizes that at the time
the injury happened there came into being only an "ethical" or "moral" claim
against the United States and not a legal one. Although it could be argued that
a private individual would not be liable until payment by the one seeking indemnity, and that this is "under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred," 10 nevertheltss it is felt that the
language of the Act in granting jurisdiction clearly restricts actions to ones where
a claim against the United States came into being at the time of the original
act. Similarly, where the payment is made after the original claim has been
barred by the statute of limitation, it has been held that the claim for indemnity
is not timely. 1' The broader questions in indemnity and contribution will be
6 28 U. S. C. A. 2401(b), Chapter 92, Public Law 55, 81st Congress, 1st session, approved 25
April 1949.
7 Only claims after this date are cognizable in the courts, 28 U. S. C. A. § 1546(b).
8 Balboa Shipping v. Standard Fruit, 85 F. Supp. 312 (D. C. N. Y. 1949).
9 Terminal R. Ass'n. v.U. S., 182 F.2d 149 (C. A. 8th 1950).
10 28 U. S. C. A. § 1346(b).
11 Ryan Stevedoring Co, v. U. S., 175 F.2d 490 (C. A. 2nd 1949).
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treated later in this article for here our attention is directed solely to a consideration of the statute of limitation.
In Ballance v. U.S.12 the factual situation called for a solution based squarely on the effect of the amendatory language of 25 April 1949. Claimant therein
was injured on 15 December 1945. The complaint was filed on 25 April 1950.
Clearly the action was barred by the terms of the original limitation provision
of the Act, since it would have had to have been filed at least by 2 August 1947
to be timely. The court looked to the legislative history of the amendatory sentence
and was impressed by this statement-"The bill would, therefore, revive all
those otherwise expired claims accruing on or after January 1, 1945." i s Basing
its decision on this disclosure of legislative intent, the court overruled the motion
of the government to dismiss the complaint. Ignoring for the moment the legislative history, which courts have done for years, another interpretation of the
statute could have been evolved. On those claims wherein the one year limitation had not run, i.e., those accruing in the year prior to 25 April 1949, the
time limit was extended for a period of one year. On claims accruing after
that date the time limit would be two years. This would be consistent with the
language of the original one year statute which stated that if an action was not
brought within one year the claim "shall be forever barred."1 4 This interpretation would have eliminated the question of whether rights which have been
"forever barred" may be revived. In effect, under the decision of this case,
the Congress created a cause of action or gave new rights to those persons whose
claims were otherwise barred. 15
More difficult of solution is the first problem of interpretation posed above.
There, the local law on which the federal cause of action is based has provided
for a termination of the rights created as opposed to a termination of the
remedy. A reference to the former article and the discussion of whether the Act
created a new cause of action or merely removed a procedural bar to an already
existing cause of action will place in proper perspective the comments which
follow. There are indications that there is still doubt on this matter because a
District Judge recently said:
"Itis my opinion that the broad terms of the Act effect only the removal of the procedural bar to a suit against the United States and
that they do not create a new liability where none existed under the substantive law theretofore." 1 6
12 93 F. Supp. 681 (D. C. Kans. 1950).
13 H. R. No. 276, March 21, 1949, accompanying H. R. 779. U. S. Code Cong. Service, Vol. 2,

81st Cong. 1st Sess., 1949, p. 1227.
14 See footnote 4, supra.
15 See Turner Terminal Co. v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 441 (D. C. Ala. 1950).
16 Lynne, J., in Kendrick v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 441 (D. C. Ala. 1950). However, in all fairness,
it must be noted that there existed no liability under the state law of the place where the act
or omission occurred. Strictly speaking, then, it can be considered that even though the Act actually
created a new federal cause of action based on state laws, that since in this case none existed by
state law that as a result there was no federal cause of action created.
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In Young v. U. S.1 7 the action was filed within one year after the amendatory sentence b'ecame law and within two years after accrual of the cause of the
action. However, it was commenced more than one year after the accrual of the
cause of action. The claim was for a wrongful death in the District of Columbia
which has a one year statute of limitation for actions of this type which is construed as substantive, i.e., the right is extinguished and not merely the remedy.
If a private individual had been sued under these same circumstances there would
have been no liability because the rights of the plaintiff would have expired automatically. The court held that Congress changed any conflicting limitation period in
the local statute, but there was a vigorous dissent which indicated that the result
of the majority would be proper only if the limitation merely affected the remedy.
It is felt that the court reached the proper result on the theory that this is a
new federal cause of action based upon the standards of conduct established
by the local jurisdictions, and being a new federal cause of action the limitation
set by Congress controls. Under this theo-y, Congress did not actually change
for the purposes of this action the substantive law of the state, but merely inserted
a limitation which would bar the new federal cause of action.
Perry v. U. S.1 poses the problem of causes of action accruing to minors.
The claimant therein was a minor when injured in 1943 by an Army military
policeman. His suit was instituted on 21 July 1947, and he contended that it was
timely because of the following provision:
"The action of any prerson under legal disability or beyond the seas
at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years after
the disability ceases."' 19
The court ruled against the contention of the plaintiff and held that this clause
did not postpone the accrual of the tort claim. There is a serious question as to
whether this clause applies to tort claims at all, though the court did not mention
such a possibility. The minor who is injured may prosecute his claim within
the normal two year period through his next friend, guardian ad litem, or
however a particular state may provide.20 The very language of the clause extending the time of filing for persons under a legal disability indicates that
it is not applicable to tort claims. A person "beyond the seas at the time the
claim accrues" would hardly be covered by the tort claims law. 21 Furthermore, this
language codified a section of the code in effect prior to the enactment
17

184 F.2d 587 (C. A. D. C. 195o).

18 170 F.2d 844 (C. A. 6th 1948).

19 28 U. S. C. A. § 2401(a).
20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) "Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a
representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the
representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or
incompetent person does not have a duly appointed representative he may sue by his next friend
or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent
person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the infant or incompetent person."
21 See 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(k) excluding claims arising in a foreign country.
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of the Tort Claims Act. 22 Section 2401 (b) codifies the previous provision of the

Act which did not contain such an extension for the claims of minors, 2 8 and the
section does not add one. Too, the language quoted is combined with that providing

for claims which have a six year statute of limitation and which obviously includes claims other than those covered by the tort provisions of Section 2401 (b).
It is extremely doubtful that a court faced with the problem would allow the
extension intimated by Perry v. U. S. to apply to the claims of minors. Certainly
no lawyer would risk an adverse decision on this point by allowing the two year
period to run.
Marino v. U. S.24 illustrates both the alternative method of seeking relief
against the United States for claims of $1000 and less and the expanded period
within which to bring suits when such a claim has been filed and either subsequently withdrawn or disposed of finally. Briefly stated, such claims .can be filed with
the appropriate government agency which is given the power to make an administrative determination as to the liability of the United States. 25 The two year
statute of limitation is applicable to the filing of such a claim. 26 If the claim
has been timely filed with an agency within this two year period then an additional
six months period is granted in which to file a civil action measured from "either
the date of withdrawal of such claim from the agency or the date of mailing
notice by the agency of final disposition of the claim."27 Withdrawal is accomplished by giving fifteen days written notice to the federal agency involved.2 8
In Marino v. U. S., previously mentioned, several claims arose from the alleged
negligence of a Coast Guard jeep on 21 December 1946. On 22 April 1947 a
claim of $4550 was forwarded to the Coast Guard. Because three separate claims
of $50.00, $3000.00, and $1500.00 had been consolidated, the Coast Guard
gave proper notification on 23 October 1947 to submit three separate claims
and also advised the latter two claimants, one of which was the plaintiff, that
there could be no administrative action on claims over $1,000.00. Separate claims
were submitted in the amounts stated in November, 1947, and on 22 January
1948 there was another notification that there was no authority to consider claims
over $1,000.00. On 28 January 1948 these two claimants, including Marino,
authorized a reduction to $1,000.00. This authorization came after the running
of the then existing statute of limitation of one year. On 8 April 1948 Marino
was notified that his claim had been disapproved, and he commenced his action on
12 July 1948, which was within six months after the final disposition by the
agency. The claimant for $50.00, whose claim had not been finally disposed of,
22 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (20) (1940 ed.)
23 28 u. S. C. A. § 942 (1940 ed.). See Reviser's Notes, § 2401, U. S. Code Cong. Serv. 80th
Cong. 2nd Sess. p. 1914.

24 82
25 28
ts 28
27 28
28 28

F.
U.
U.
U.
U.

Supp. 190 (D. C. N. Y. 1948).
S. C. A. § 2672.
S. C. A. § 2401(b).
S, C. A. § 2401(b).
S. C. A. § 2675.
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joined in this action. The court held that Marino's claim had not been timely
filed since no claim over which the agency had jurisdiction was submitted within
the period allowed. The claimant for $50.00 had brought his suit prematurely
since the claim had been neither withdrawn nor had there been a final disposition
by the agency involved. This case should forewarn counsel that a claim presented
to an agency should be for $1,000.00 or less, if, after the statute of limitations has
expired, he expects to have available the six months extension in time for filing
suit.

29

Anderegg v. U. S.3 is a confusing case on this very question of the extension
of time for filing a suit when a claim has been presented. There the damage occurred on 2 January 1945 and the civil action was commenced on 14 April 1948.
Anderegg had apparently filed a claim with the War Department, but the
date is not stated in the opinion of the court. However, it was denied on some
unspecified date in Novembr, 1947. The court dismissed the action saying that
the claim filed with the government agency did not defeat the then one year
statute of limitation. It has been pointed out that this is incorrect and that if a
claim has been presented then an additional six months period in which to
file is available. 5 ' Only if Anderegg's complaint was filed over six months after
the date of final disposition in November, 1947, could this decision be correct.
The broad language of the court is inconsistent with the provisions of the statute
in cases of this kind. On one point, however, there is some considerable authority.
Neither agencies of the government nor its agents can waive the statute of
limitations. 2 Some jurisdictional problems involving suits filed after claims have
been presented will be considered later in this article.
Turner Terminal Co. v. U. S.33 involves a question of the effect of the
amendatory sentence on the jurisdiction of the court. On the night of May
19-20, 1946, the wharf of the plaintiff was damaged by a boat on navigable
waters. At this time, the United States had consented to be sued in Admiralty,3 4
but not at law; and this type of action was denominated a law action.3 5 The
former one year statute of limitation ran as to the action under the Tort Claims
Act, and on 18 May 1948, a libel in admiralty was filed. At this time, the admiralty court had no jurisdiction; it not being extended to this type of action until
19 June 1948.36 In that libel the court held that the statute had run on the
admiralty suit. Plaintiff filed again in law on 22 April 1950 contending that
29 See also Franaino v. U. S., 83 F. Supp. 10 (D. C. N. Y. 1949). The court in this case made
an obvious error by stating that since the accident occurred on 1 July 1945 that an action was barred
on 1 July 1946. This was over a month before the Tort Claim Act became law!
80 171 F.2d 127 (C. A. 4th 1948).

81 § 420 of the Act of 2 August 1946 contained a similar provision which would have been
applicable on the date of this decision.
82 See Marino v. U. S., 82 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D. C. N. Y. 1948).
88 93 F. Supp. 441 (D. C. Ala. 1950).
84 Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. A. § 741 et seq.

85 Turner Terminal, Inc. v. U. S. 177 F.2d 844 (C. A. 9th).
86 Extension of Admiralty jurisdiction Act, 46 U. S. C. A. § 740.
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the extension of time in the Act of 25 April 1949 relating to tort claims enlarged
the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine cases of this type. However,
the terms of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act made a libel in admiralty
the exclusive remedy available since suit had not been previously filed under
the Tort Claims Act.87 Since the court did not have jurisdiction, and since it was
not enlarged by the amendatory sentence, the court properly dismissed the civil
action for want of jurisdiction. Counsel for a party damaged under the circumstances
of this case and similar situations will have to reassure himself that the action is
brought on the proper side of the District Court. Otherwise, a subsequent di,missal for want of jurisdiction may mean that the statute of limitation has run
in the meanwhile on the claim and it cannot thereafter be presented to any court.
There is one other consideration to examine however. Assume the plaintiff
has filed timely in the district court pleading a cause of action under the Tort
Claims Act. As a matter of fact, his case is really one for the admiralty jurisdiction.
After the two years limitation has expired it is brought to the attention of the
court that this is a matter properly cognizable in admiralty. Should the plaintiff
be allowed to amend to plead the proper admiralty act, to relate such amendment
back to the original date of filing, and to have the case removed from the civil
to the admiralty docket? The operative facts which plaintiff states to show that
he is entitled to relief would be the same in either case. This mistake in terminology does not change the fact that his situation is one for which relief is
available although under a different statute than the one pleaded. However, since
the court takes judicial notice of Congressional enactments, it would seem that
the plaintiff should not be penalized for his error. To dismiss would signify a
return to the formalistic conceptualism of the common law and the technical rules
8
of pleading thereunder.3
State workmen's compensation laws merit a brief consideration. Matovac
v. U. S., 89 concerning the New York Workmen's Compensation Law, is illustrative
of the impact the statute of limitation contained therein has in connection with
the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff was injured on 11 January 1945 and his right to
sue the third person involved expired prior to the enactment of the Tort Claims
Act. By an amendment to the state law the period to institute a third party
action was extended to nine months after passage of a law creating new or additional
remedies, e.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act of 2 August 1946.40 Hence 2 May
1947 was the last day for filing an action against the United States as the third
87 "Provided, that as to any suit against the United States for damage or injury done or consummated on land by a vessel on navigable waters the Public Vessels Act or Suits in Admiralty Act, as
appropriate, shall constitute the exclusive remedy for all causes of action arising after June 19, 1948,
and for all causes of action where suit has not been hitherto filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act."
38 Compare Bay State Crabmeat Co. v. U. S., 78 F. Supp. 131 (D. C, Mass. 1948) where the
court allowed the amendment to relate back and transferred the cause from the admiralty to the civil
docket.
89 91 F. Supp. 247 (D. C. N. Y. 1950).
40 Workmen's Compensation Law N. Y. § 29.
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party under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The insurance carrier who had
paid the claim then on 3 May 1947 had the right of subrogation to the original
claim of the plaintiff by state law. Plaintiff sued on 17 July 1947, which was
timely under the original federal statute. The court granted the motion of the
United States for a summary judgment on the ground that the rights of the
plaintiff had expired by operation of law under the New York statute and that
the insurance company had been subrogated. This result would appear to differ
from that reached in the wrongful death case, Young v. U. S., cited previously,
where the state statute of limitation was held not to apply. However, the result
can be justified by pointing out that, in effect, the plaintiff has made an election
under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and to allow the federal statute of
limitations to control here would interfere with the rights of the insurance
carrier granted by way of subrogation. In the wrongful death situation no rights
of third persons were involved.

Parties in the Action-Subrogees
U. S. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 41 resolved the conflict in the
judicial decisions, indicated in the previous article, as to whether subrogees had
a "claim" within the meaning of the Act, and, further, if there existed such
a "claim" whether the Anti-Assignment Act 4 2 permitted an action on it. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, held that the AntiAssignment Act did not apply to an assignment by operation of law and that
an insurance company has a "claim" within the meaning of the Tort Claims
Act by virtue of subrogation when there has been payment made to an insured who would have been able to bring an action based on the original
occurrence. As to the manner of enforcing the claim, the insurance company where it has paid the entire amount of the claim of the insured
it will sue in its own name as the real party in interest under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).1 3 Where the insurance company has been only
partially subrogated, there is a different problem. At common law the suit
would have been prosecuted in the name of the insured to the use of the
insurer. However, Federal Rule 17(a), mentioned above, would permit each
party to sue on that part of the entire claim which may be considered as belonging
to him. The court denominates these plaintiffs "necessary parties," and an
omitted party could be added under the provisions of Federal Rule 19(b)"4
S. Ct. 209 (1949).
41 338 U. S. 366, 7.0
42 31 U. S. C. A. § 203.
43 "'Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest* * a"
44 "When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to
be accorded between those already parties, have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process and venue and can be made parties without depriving the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it, the court shall order them summoned to
appear in the action. The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them as to either service of process or venue can be acquired only
by their consent or voluntary appearance * * * but the judgment rendered therein does not affect
the rights or liabilities of absent persons."
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by the motion contemplated in Federal Rule 21.45 An insurance company or
another initiating an action should specifically state those others who hold
portions of the claim. 4 6 In the event that both parties file separate civil actions
against the United States, whether they be partial subrogees or a partial subrogee
and the person originally injured, the court may order the actions consolidated
under Federal Rule 42(a).4 7 One problem recognized and specifically not passed
upon concerns the rights of the United States when it has a counterclaim or setoff against the original injured person in the event the insurance company brings
the action as permitted by this case. This will not be very often undoubtedly,
while there will be many subrogees. The case reaches, then, a very workable
result. Finally, the fact that there was an actual written assignment would be
of no operative importance factually since the writing would have no legal
48
significance.
Parties in the Action-Persons in the Armed Forces
That "status" alone is not sufficient to defeat an action brought against the
United States where one serviceman has been injured by the negligence of another
serviceman was determined by the Supreme Court in two cases, Brooks v. U. S. 49
and Jefferson, v. U. S.50 In the Brooks case the court refused to make a judicial
exclusion in the case of servicemen when they had been injured by the negligence
of another serviceman in a "non-service connected" incident. The automobile
accident involving an Army truck occurring while the injured soldier was on
furlough, which was the foundation of the civil action against the United States,
clearly had nothing to do with the assigned dutics of the injured soldier nor with
the obligation which devolved upon him by virtue of his being a soldier.
The state law would give a cause of action in those circumstances and hence
the.re would be standards of conduct on which to base a federal cause of
6
action. T
However, where the injury was "s ervice-connected" then there would
be no state cause of action because of the possible interference by the state
in a totally federal matter, and hence no claim under the Act. Thus, in
the situations considered by the court in this type of case, the injured serviceman could not recover. Death caused by the negligence of a service doctor, 52
death caused by the negligence resulting in a barracks fire,53 and an injury re45 "* * * Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party * * *."
46 Federal Rule 19(c). "In any pleading in which relief is asked, the pleader shall set forth the
names, if known to him, of persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, but who are not joined, and shall state why they are omitted."
47 "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such other orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
48 Nat. Am. Fire Ins. Co. v. U. S., 171 F.2d 206 (C. A. 9th 1948).
49 337 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 918 (1949).

50 71 S. Ct. 153 (1950).

51 See previous discussion in 53 DICK. L. REv. 163 at p. 169 e seq (1949).
52 U. S. v. Griggs, 71 S. Ct. 153 (1950).
53 Feres v. U. S.,71 S.'Ct. 153 (1950).
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suiting from the negligence of a service doctor in leaving a towel in the abdomen
of the plaintiff 64 all illustrate the "service-connected" disability or injury which
does not give rise to a cause of action in state law and consequently there is no
claim under the act. Should anyone question the results in these last cases on
the grounds of harshness it must be remembered that the services had previously
established a plan of pensions and gratuities which compensate the parties involved. For a "non-service connected" injury the Tort Claims Act simply adds an
additional and concurrent remedy, but the United States would not be liable
to pay for those items of damages satisfied by pensions and gratuities." There
is,therefore, no election of remedies here and the lawyer is not faced with the
problem of making the determination as to whether it would be more profitable
to take the benefits provided by the pension laws, etc. or to pursue the remedy
of the Act. In several cases discussed later this will be his somewhat delicate job.
The serviceman who has been discharged and subsequently is injured through
the negligence of a doctor in a Veteran's Hospital, in which he is entitled to be
treated by virtue of his prior service, would not fall within the ban of the
Jefferson case, and he would be entitled to maintain his action. 56 The rationale
of this decision can be predicated on the thought that a state cause of action
exists in this situation, 57 and there is no federal "status" which is interfered
with, although the veteran is enjoying a federally created right.
Parties in the Action-joinder and Impleader
Up to now this paper has considered the parties in the action from the
standpoint of the position opposite to that of the United States. Turning to the
party or parties who are aligned with the United States in the question of
liability to the plaintiff, and some of whom may have rights against the United
States by way of contribution or indemnity, it is found that the Supreme Court
has recently considered and settled in its opinion in the U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co.
and Capital Transit Co. v. U. S.11 cases many of the prior conflicts. First, the
court stated that a claim for contribution comes within the terms of the Act. Thus,
a joint tort-feasor with the United States where the local law gives such a right
can assert that right against the United States. Once the right was recognized by
the court the procedural method to be used in enforcing it became of importance.
Would the United States have to be sued in another and separate action, or would
Federal Rule 14(a) 59 be applicable? More simply stated, had the United
Jefferson v. U. S., 71 S. Ct. 153 (1950).
55 U. S. v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (C. A. 4th 1949).
50 Santana v. U. S., 175 F.2d 320 (C. A. 1st 1949).
57 However, in some states the fact that the hospital is considered a charitable institution may
operate as a bar to the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. e.g. Pennsylvania. See
Perucki v. U. S., 76 F. Supp. 34 (D. C. Pa. 1948) and 80 F. Supp. 959 (D. C. Pa. 1948).
58 71 S. Ct. 399 (1951).
59 "Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ex parse or, after the service of his
answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person who is not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiff's daim against him. * * -54
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States consented to an action by the original defendant in the same suit by way
of a third-party action? The court, wisely it seems, held that the United States
had consented not only to the contribution claim, but also to the impleader procedure
of Federal Rule 14(a). The procedural impediments advanced in argument by
the counsel for the government were not considered as difficult of solution.
The fact that the original individual defendant would be entitled to a jury trial
and there would be none in the third-party action against the United States
creates no problem because Federal Rule 42(b) providing for separate trials
60
would be applicable.
Should there be compelling reasons in an individual factual situation
whereby it would be prejudicial to the rights of the Government to be
impleaded, the judge may, in the exercise of the discretion granted by Federal
Rule 14(a), deny the motion of the defendant as a third-party plaintiff to add
the United States as a third-party defendant. This decision also sanctions by
indirection the joinder of the United States with an individual plaintiff on a
theory of joint tort liability. In Sappington v. Barrett,0' which the court mentions
seemingly in disapproval of the ruling of the Court of Appeals therein, the original
plaintiff, as contrasted with the third-party plaintiff involved in the Yellow Cdb
case, had moved to add the United States as a party defendant under Federal
Rule 19(a), mentioned previously. The Court of Appeals had held that leave
to add the United States should not be granted, based on a lack of power rather
than the exercise of discretion. This analysis indicates that the Supreme Court
would approve the addition of the United States as a joint defendant should it
be called upon to rule on the matter.
It will be noted from a perusal of the opinions of the lower courts in
these actions62 that jurisdiction existed in the suits originally brought against
the individual defendants, one by virtue of diversity and the requisite jurisdictional amount, and the other because the accident on which the claim was based
occurred in the District of Columbia. The implication of this fact will be of considerable importance when the United States is joined as a defendant with an
individual based on a theory of joint tort liability. Should the civil action against
the individual joint tort-feasor be considered as merely ancillary to the claim against
the United States so that if the claim against the United States fails for other
than jurisdictional reasons the court can proceed to an adjudication on the merits
on the individual claim in the absence of independent jurisdictional grounds? " s
Apparently this question should be answered in the negative. Wasserman v.
Perugini64 is to that effect and states that a right of contribution against the
60 "The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim * *
61 182 F.2d 102 (C. A. D. C. 1950).
62 Capitol Transit Co. v. U. S., 183 F.2d 825 (C. A. D. C. 1950) and HowCy v. Yellow Cab Co.
(U. S., third-party defendant, 181 F.2d 967 (C. A. 3rd 1950).
68 CI. Hum v. Oursle- 289 U. S. 238, 53 S. Ct. 586 (1933).
64 173 F.2d 305 (C. A. 2nd.1949). Cf. Prechtel v. U. S.. 84 F. Supp. 889 (D. C. N. Y. 1949).
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United States would not aid the jurisdiction. Certainly, however, if the United
States is dismissed as a party defendant, the court may proceed to adjudicate
the claim between the individual parties if diversity jurisdiction does exist.8 5
Somewhat different considerations are present when the government employee
has been sued originally and the plaintiff moves to join the United States. The
Act provides that a judgment against the United States shall act as a complete
bar to any action by the claimant against th'e government employee whose conduct
67
provides the basis for the claim. 68 In the one case involving this problem
the court ruled that the United States had not consented to be joined along with
its employees. This would seem to be correct because of the policy indicated in
the immunity provided by the government to an employee in the event a judgment
is obtained against the United States.
A related question is whether a counterclaim can be interposed against the
United States when it has originated the suit against the individual. A broad
application of the doctrine of the Yellow Cab case would allow such a counterclaim on the ground of consent, as it must be apparent that consent has been
given to more than separate suits against the government. There are no procedural
problems which differ from those in the main case. However, the only authority
is to the contrary, but the decision antedated the one above.68 On the other hand,
where the United States is the original defendant, the Act clearly states that
the court has "jurisdiction of any set-off, counterclaim, or other claims or demand
on the part of the United States against any plaintiff commencing an action *
* * *"69 This would be true even where the plaintiff is a sovereign state, for
the state has conscnted to be sued where the United States is involved by the
very nature of the federal plan.7 0 One final observation on parties plaintiff
before turning to indemnity. State law will govern the capacity of any person
who sues in a representative capacity and the requisites provided therein must
71
be shown in the federal court.
Indemnity claims against the government have caused no little difficulty,
part of which was discussed previously in connection with the statute of limitations. Otherwise, the claim for indemnity is one to which the government has
consented in much the same manner as in the suit for contribution among joint
72
tort-feasors, although admittedly there may be conceptual differences.

65 Mackrey v. U. S. and Boynton, 88 F. Supp. 696 (D. C. Conn. 1949).
66 28 U. S. C. A. § 2676.

67 Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D. C. Mass. 1948).

68

69
70
71
72

U. S. v. Pittsley, 86 F. Supp. 413 (D. C. Mass. 1949).
28 U. S. C. A. § 1346(c). Maragakis v. U. S.,172 F.2d 393 (C. A. 10th 1949).
California v. U. S., 91 F. Supp. 722 (D. C. Cal. 1950),b
Olson v. U. S., 175 F.2d 510 (1949) and Federal Rule 17(b).
Terminal R. Ass'n. v. U. S.,182 F.2d 149 (C. A. 8th 195b); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. U. S.,

175 F.2d 490 (C. A. 2nd 1949); Brown ahd Root, Inc. v. U. S. 92 F. Supi. 257 (D. C. Tean. 1950).
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Exclusions-General
The Tort Claims Act did not completely abrogate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity for it provided for certain specified exclusions. 7 3 Section 2680(k) of 28
U.S.C.A. excludes any claim for "interference with contract rights." However,
the torts of those agents of the United States performing duties under a con74
tractual arrangement are not considered within the language of exclusion.
Furthermore, where a contract raises certain implied obligations, the breach of
these latter is within the purview of the liability provision, while an action for
breach of the contract would be excluded. 76 If the real theory of the civil action
of the plaintiff is contractual though cast in an ex delictu manner, there is no
jurisdiction in the court, such as a suit for damages for use of a bomb sight
indicator chart allegedly originated and owned by the plaintiff, 6 the alleged
illegal use of a secret process, 77 or loss on a contract caused by the dissolution
of the O.P.A.78 The Act cannot be used to test the discharge of a civilian em79
ployee of the government since this is contractual.
Claims based on the intentional torts are excluded, for example, false
imprisonment and false arrest. 8 0 Where the state law allows a recovery for mental
suffering inflicted by a wilful trespass, there can be no recovery under the Act,
even though plaintiff is not given a cause of action by state law for negligent
conduct which results in such mental pain. 8 ' A suit against a collector of customs is specifically excluded,8 2 as are those covered by the Suits in Admiralty
Act or the Public Vessels Act,83 and claims arising from activities of the Panama
Railroad Co.8 4 The fact that the Congress governs the District of Columbia does
not indicate that the Act waived the bar of sovereign immunity in negligence case
against the District."5
Exclusions-Combatant Activities
The Act specifically excludes "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war."86
There are two conditions in this exclusion: (1) The activities must be "combatant,"
and (2) these combatant activities must be "during time of war." In Johnson v.
§ 2680.
Nicholson v. U. S., 177 F.2d 768 (C. A. 5th 1949).
75 U. S. v. Scrinopski, 179 F.2d 959 (C. A. 5th 1950).
76 Fulmer v. U. S., 83 F. Supp. 137 (D. C. Ala. 1949).
77 Aktiebokaget Bofors v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 131 (D. C. D. C. 1950). This case contains an
interesting footnote to history in the letter of Harry Hopkins to counsel for plaintiff,
78 Jones v. U. S., 89 F. Supp. 980 (D. C. Iowa 1949).
79 Lane v. Royall, 179 F.2d 5 (C. A. 8th 1950).
80 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(h). Denahey v. Isbrandtsen Co., 80 F. Supp. 180 (D. C. N. Y. 1948).
81 U. S. v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (C. A. 9th 1950).
82 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(c). Nakasheff v. Continental Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 87 (D. C. N. Y. 1950).
78 28 U. S. C. A.
74

88 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(d). Thomason v. U. S., 184 F.2d 105 (C. A. 9th 1950) Cf. U. S. v. S. C.

Highway Dep't, 171 F.2d 893 (C. A. 4th 1948), Somerset Seafood Co. v. U. S., 95 F. Supp.
298 (D. C. Ind. 1951).
84 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(m). Gardner v. Panama R. Co. 185 F.2d 730 (C. A. 5th (1950).
83 Douffas v. Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 644 (D. C. D. C. 1949).
86 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(j).
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U. S.8 the plaintiff alleged pollution of his clam farm by naval vessels during
the period from December, 1945 to sometime in 1946. The vessels were ammunition ships which had been on their way to the Pacific war front when the actual
fighting ceased and which had thereupon been recalled to the West Coast.
One cannot but recognize that the United States was and still is in a technical
state of war with Japan. The acceptance of this definition would eliminate many
claims. However, the court took a more practical view of the language of the
statute and interpreted it to mean "during actual hostilities." This would cover
the conflict in Korea wherein the Congress has not actually declared war.
As to the other condition, the court, in defining "combatant activities"
was well aware of the logistics of modern warfare as is apparent from the
following excerpt:
"Aiding others to swing the sword of battle is certainly a 'combatant
activity,' but the art of returning it to a place of safekeeping after the
fighting is over cannot logically be catalogued as a 'combatant activity.'

"88

This is a difficult line to draw, and it is associated with the directness of the
connection of the alleged negligent act to the prosecution of hostilities. Thus,
a soldier on guard at a wharf during the period of actual hostilities, who negligently shoots a civilian, has at most an indirect connection with the fighting, though he
be guarding material which is being transshipped to the war zone. 89 The obvious purpose of the exclusion was to prevent claims from actual hostilities, but
the modern concept of war and total mobilization tends to cause practically
every governmental as well as civilian activity to be engaged in the war. The
extension of combatant activities from the actual area of battle to those matters
having a direct connection is warranted under modern conditions of which
the Congress certainly had an awareness.
The case of the discharged serviceman who goes to a Veteran's Administration hospital for treatment of a wound received in combat and subsequently is
injured by the negligence of a doctor in treating this wound requires a determination as to whether this is "combatant." Perucki v. U. S. 90 discussed in the previous article, took the viewpoint that this was within the exclusion. However, a more
enlightened view is expressed in Santana v. U. S.,9 1 where the court ruled that
there was jurisdiction to determine the merits of the claim of the plaintiff. Although the main contention of the United States was on the "status" theory,
developed previously herein, it is apparent that any jurisdictional matter would
have been considered.
87 170 F.2d 767 (C. A, 9th 1948).
88 ld. at 770.

89 Cerri v. U. S. 80 F. Supp. 831 (D. C. Cal. 1948).
90 76 F. Supp. 34 (D. C. Pa. 1948) and 80 F. Supp. 959 (D. C. Pa. 1948).
91 175 F.2d 320 (C. A, 1st 1949), Bandy v. U, S., 92 F. Supp. 36b (D. C. Nev. 1950).
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Exclusions-Foreign Countries
U. S. v. Spelar92 considered the exclusion relating to "any claim arising in
a foreign country." 9 3 There a Newfoundland air base which had been leased
to the United States in the destroyer deal with Great Britain was held to be a
"foreign country." The basic point was that the laws of a foreign country
would have to be used to determine the liability of the United States. The
Vermilya-Brown caseu4 extending coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
a similar base in Bermuda was distinguished because there a law of the United
Staes was involved and the application of foreign law was not necessary. An
administrative determination by the Secretary of State that certain territory conquered or occupied is not part of or possession of the United States would
control.' r
Exclusions-Discret*onaryDuties
The exclusion as to discretionary functions or duties 96 has been before
the courts so many times in the past two years that the subject warrants a somewhat detailed treatment here. Three aspects will be considered: (1) those duties
which have been denominated discretionary; (2) the duties which have been
labelled non-discretionary; and (3) those duties which are discretionary but after
the exercise of the discretion some negligence occurs which results in injury. The
dividing line between the policy formulating function in the government, which
is discretionary, and the ministerial function, which is non-discretionary, is sometimes difficult to ascertain. One category, however, is well-established. Officials
of the United States acting in connection with the development of navigable
streams are generally in a discretionary position. Thus, the planning of dikes
in the Missouri River,9 7 changing the course of a navigable stream, 98 the
opening of flood gates, 99 raising the water of a stream by the construction of a
dam, 100 and blasting in order to deepen a channel of the Mississippi River 101
all have been within the exclusion when civil actions have been brought for
the injuries resulting from alleged negigence in performing these duties. Of
course, the plaintiff is not entirely without a remedy for his case may fall within
the provisions of the Fifth Amendment. 102 Similarly, the dissolution of the
O.P.A. which resulted in a loss on a contract, l '3 a failure on the part of the
92 338 U. S. 217, 70 S. Ct. 10 (1949).
9S 28 1. S. C. A. § 2680(k).
94 Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S.

380, 69 S. Ct. 142 (1948).
95 Cobb v,U. S., 91 F. Supp. 717 (D. C. Cal. 1950).
96 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(a) "Any claim * * * based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
97 Thomas v. U. S., 81 F. Supp. 881 (D. C. Mo. 1949).
98 Coates v. U. S., 181 F.2d 816 (C. A. 8th 19i0).
99 Olsen v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 150 (D. C. N. D. 1950).
100 North v. U. S., 94 F. Supp. 824 (D. C. Utah 1950).
101 Boyce v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 866 (D. C. Iowa 1950).
102 Coates v. U. S., 181 F.2d 816 (C. A. 8th 1950).
108 Jones v. U. S., 89 F. Supp. 980 (D. C. Iowa 1949).
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government to operate a mine after it had been taken over by the Secretary of
the Interior under an Executive order of the President 04 and a determination
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act as to whether migratory birds could
be hunted and killed in any particular year 05 have been denominated as discretionary functions. An examination of the statute involved is used as a
guide in this determination, and where the action of the official has been circumscribed by statute or where the effect of the exercise of his discretion has been
previously settled, then the duty is ministerial or he is foreclosed from a further
exercise of his discretion. Thus, an official could not affect by a subsequent contract a previous contract for grazing privileges, 106 an agreement by an agency
to abide by certain governmental rules would remove the discretion of the
agency, 10 7 and the operation of an irrigation system is non-discretionary."08
The third aspect mentioned above has arisen usually in connection with the
medical services. While a doctor may have a discretion in discharging a patient
from a hospital, 09 or a hospital may have a discretion in admitting patients, such
as in the case of dependents of servicemen,"' or employees for minor ailments
when they would not otherwise be eligible,"' nevertheless once this discretion
has been exercised there exists no discretion as to the treatment accorded and
the hospital is under a duty to attend and treat and if there is negligence then the
12
United States will be held liable."
"Within the Scope of his Office or Employment"
There are two points to be determined here. The first is whether or not
the alleged agent is an employee of the federal government. If he is found to be
an employee it must then be determined whether or not at the time of the injury
he was acting within the scope of such employment. A trustee in bankruptcy, though
an officer of the court appointing him, is not an employee of the United States.113
A local committee which by the terms of a federal statute assigns certain inspectors for administrative duties are not employees and neither are the inspectors
so appointed. 114 Neither is a member of the National Guard when it is still in
state service, though equipment of the United States is used in carrying out
its functions.16

104 Old King Coal Co. v. U. S., 88 F. Supp. 124 (D. C. Iowa 1949).
105 Sicmaan v. U. S., Ryal v. U. S., 184 F.2d 616 (C. A. 7th 1950).
106 Oman v. U. S., 179 F.2d 738 (C. A. ioth 1949).
107 Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate, 176 F.2d 414 (C. A. 4th 1949).
108 Ure v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 779 (D. C. Ore. 1950).
109 Kendrick v. U. S., 82 F. Supp. 430 (D. C. Ala. 1949).
110 Denny v. U. S., 171 F.2d 365 (C. A. 5th 1948).
111 Dishman v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. C. Md. 1950).
112 Costley v. U. S., 181 F.2d 723 (C. A. 5th 1950).
119 Cromei v. U. S., 177 F.2d 275 (C. A. 5th 1949).
114 Lavitt v. U. S. 177 F.2d 627 (C. A. 2nd 1949).
115 Glasgow v. U. S., 95 F. Supp. 213 (I. C. Ala. 1951).
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The application of local law largely determines whether the employee is
acting within the scope of his employment. An exception is made in the event
the local law has a statute or rule which holds the owner liable for automobile
accidents regardless of whether or not the driver is in and about the business
of the owner. 116 This simply means that although state law will be used to
determine the question of scope of employment it will not be used to expand
the liability of the government outside the provisions of the Act. Where the
United States does not have control of its employee, 117 or where a doctor operates
on a person not authorized to receive treatment 8 there is no liability.
Where the employee who is negligent is a member of the armed forces
acting within the scope of his office or employment . . . means acting in line
of duty." 119 As is known to anyone familiar with the services, the term "in
line of duty" has been defined many times in connection with certain gratuities
which are dependent on whether a death or injury occurred therein, and for this
purpose the term has an exceedingly broad meaning. A man on leave is considered
"in line of duty" for this purpose. However, the courts have consistently failed
to apply this broad meaning and have held that where a soldier on leave injures
someone the United States is not liable.' 2 0 Hence, the definition of "line of
duty" is restricted to "circumstances where a private individual would be liable."
A serviceman off on a lark of his own,' 21 doing something contrary to regulations
such as transporting a colonel's private gear,' 2 2 or who has deviated from his
instructions,1 2 3 or is not in and about the business of the United States, 12 4 is
not within the scope of his employment or "in line of duty." The service definition
of "in line of duty" has been limited quite properly to intra-service matters and
as to third person the concepts of state law as to scope of employment serve as a
guide.
Administrative Claims and Causes of Action
The Tort Claims Act provides, as mentioned previously in the consideration
of the statute of limitation problems, that federal agencies have jurisdiction
to determine claims for $1,000 or less, and that a determination or award is final
116 Hubsch v. U. S.. 174 F.2d 7 (C. A. 5th 1949).

117 Sanchez v. U. S., 177 F.2d 452 (C. A. 10th 1949) (Security guard looking for lost child
to assist state police); Fries v. U. S., 170 F.2d 726 (C. A. 6th 1948) (Car and driver belonging to
United States under control of local board of health) ; Cobb v. U. S., 81 F. Supp. 9 (D. C. La. 1948)
(R. 0. T. C. instructor in high school).
118 Cannon v. U. S., 84 F. Supp. 820 (D. C. Cal. 1949).
119 28 U. S. C. A. § 2671.
120 U. S. v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (C. A. 4th 1949), Bach v. U. S., 92 F. Supp. 715 (D. C. N. Y.
1950).

(Student aviator took plane while drunk);
Hubsch v. U. S., 174 F.2d 7 (C. A. 5th 1949), Cropper v. U. S., 81 F. Supp. 81 (D. C. Fla. 1948).
122 Murphey v. U. S., 179 F.2d 743 (C. A. 9th 1950), Parrish v. U. S., 95 F. Supp. 80 (D. C. Ga.
1950).
128 Christian v. U. S., 184 F.2d 523 (C. A. 6th 1950). Cf. U. S. v. Johnson, 181 F.2d 577 (C. A.
9th 1950).
124 U. S. v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500 (C. A. 5th" 1949) (Sailor running to catch a train).
121 King v. U. S., 178 F. 2d 320 (C. A. 5th 1950)
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and conclusive on all officers of the government, except when procured by
fraud.ii1 As has been shown there are provisions for extending the statute of limitations when a claim has been presented to an agency. Furthermore, no civil action
can be "instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to
the federal agency, except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence . . .or intervening facts .. ."126 The first situation to be considered will be where a claim has been filed for less than $1,000, and a subsLquent suit is brought for an amount in excess of $1,000. Does the court have
jurisdiction over the cause of action? One court said that "no suit can be instituted in excess of the claim filed," and hence an action claiming in excess would be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.1 2 7 Since the court had no jurisdiction then an
amendment, to reduce the amount sued for, filed after the expiration of the
six month's period from withdrawal or final disposition could not be entertained.
Others, however, have treated the amount in the action which is in excess as a
nullity and simply limited recovery to the claim amount, and an amendment was
allowed merely to set the record straight, though it was not thought necessary.128
This would be true even though the claim was filed with a statement that it was
without prejudice to file in a larger amount in a civil action in the courts, since
the plaintiff cannot vary the terms of the statute. 129 Consider now the effect
of the filing of an administrative claim in excess of $1,000 which is not reduced
subsequently to $1,000.00. It would seem that the agency has no jurisdiction
and the claim is a legal nullity so that any amount could be sued for though in
excess of the claim which was presented to the agency. This result is intimated
in one case.180
Other Aspects
The facets of the Act mentioned in this portion are given a brief presentation. This does not mean that they are not of importance, because they are important in the administration of the Act. However, the number of cases and the
treatment received in the courts during the past two years have not brought them
into sharp enough focus to warrant a detailed survey.
A lawyer whose client may have benefits under another statute and who
may at the same time have a cause of action under the Tort Claims Act will have
to consider carefully whether pension or similar rights may not be more beneficial
than a recovery under the Act. Furthermore, the pursuit of one remedy may constitute an election and foreclose pursuit of the other. A pension plan which bentfits an injured person or one entitled to recover and which does not originate
125 28. U, S. C. A. 4 2671.
126 28 U. S. C. A. § 2675.

127 Franzino v. U. S.. 83 F. Supp. 10 (D. C. N. J.1949).
128 Corkle v. U. S., 94 F. Supp. 908 (D. C. D. C. 1951), Reardon v. U. S. 87 F. Supp. 35 (D.

C.

Mass. 1949).
vbgkqj cmfwyp shrdlu etaoin eetaooah
129 Carlson v. U. S., 88 F. Supp, 337 (D. C. Il. 1949).
180 iciliano v, U. S., 85 F. Supp. 726 (D. C. N. J. 1949).
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with the federal government simply is a concurrent or cumulative remedy.'H8
A pension from the United States arising from other facts, as a veteran's pension,
may serve only to reduce the recovery allowed under the Tort Claims Act.18 2 However, where the event which caused the injury gives rise to rights for compensation
3
from the government, e.g., under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act' 8
and also to rights under the Tort Claims Act then the remedies afforded are in
thle alternative and the choice of one constitutes an election. 134 Where the remedies
from the government are concurrent then the court has to reduce the damages
under the Act pro tanto. A six months pay gratuity given for the death of a serviceman will be deducted, but amounts received from National Service Life Insurance will not. 85
Where an attorney has filed an action and a recovery results the court may
award up to 20% as attorney's fees. '13 One court approved an agreement between
attorney and client which provided for a fee equal to 10% of the recovery except87

in the event of an appeal being perfected in which case the fee would be 20%,1

on the ground that there was implied authority in the Act though not express authority. This allowance of fees is within the discretion of the court and it can consider the fact that there is a state statute which allows the attorney a portion of
the recovery to cover expenses. 13 8
The Act provides that "the Attorney General, with the approval of the
court may arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under section
3 9 The
1346(b) of this title, after the commencement of an action thereon."'
court contemplated is the district court, and this is true even though the compromise is reached after the court of appeals has affirmed a lower court decision
for the defendant and the case is in the Supreme Court.14 0
The appellate courts have been occupied also with considerations involving
the evidence below. The judge of the district court hears and determines the
4
facts and the examination in the higher court goes only to the sufficiency.1 '
State law, of course, is the basis for the federal cause of action and state

181 Wham v. U. S., 180 F.2d 38 (C. A. D. C. 1950).
152 Bandy v. U. S.,82 F. Supp. 360 (D. C. Nev. 1950).
I1a 5 U. S. C. A. § 751 et seq.
184 Parr v. U. S., 172 F.2d 462 (C. A. 10th 1949), Brown and Root, Inc. v. U. S.,92 F. Supp.
257 (D. C. Texas 1950), Henson v. U. S., 88 F. Supp. 148 (D. C. Mo. 1949). Cf. Dishman v. U. S.,

93 F. Supp. 567 (D. C. Ind. 1950).
185 U. S. v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (C. A. 4th 1949).
136 28 U. S. C. A. § 2678.
137 MacHale v. U. S.,81 F. Supp. 372 (D. C. Wash. 1948).
It8 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. U. S., 170 F.2d 469 (C. A, 2nd 1948).
139 28 .U S. C. A. § 2677.
140 Hubsch v. U. S.,338 U. S. 440, 70 S. Ct. 225 (1949).
141 Evidence sufficient: Nolan v. U. S., 186 F.2d 578 (C. A. 4th 1951),

Sartori v. U. S.,

186

P.2d 679 (C. A. loth 1950), U. S. v. Benson, 185 F.2d 995 (C. A. D. C. 1950), U. S. 'V.Fotopulos,
180 Fd.2 631 (C. A. 9th 1950) Peck v. U. S.,172 F.2d 336 (C. A. l0th 1949). Evidence insufficient: Desch v. U. S., 186 F.2d 623 (C. A. 7th 1951), Rice v. U. S.,179 F.2d 26 (C. A. D. C. 1949).
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rules as to last clear chance, 142 contributory negligence, 143 res ipsa loquitur' 1have been applied. As a matter of administration when the lower court finds contributory negligence judgment should be entered for the defendant rather than
a dismissal of the action. 14 5 Every facet of state law, even as to the burden
on the plaintiff of showing freedom from contributory negligence has been
146
applied.
Conclusion
This survey has highlighted the past two years under the Tort Claims Act.
Undoubtedly the future will bring additional problems in the administration
of the Act, and the Supreme Court will resolve the existing ones which have
been pointed out. The liberal spirit of the Act has been captured by practically
all the courts, and this is typified by the Supreme Court in the Brooks and Aetna
Casualty decisions. A definitive rule on the statute of limitation problems is
most needed at the present time and it is hoped the Court will have the opportunity to formulate one in the near future.
The impact of state law makes for a lack of uniformity. Notice the difference which will occur in the same factual situation when the plaintiff is required
to sustain the burden of the ultimate risk of non-persuasion as to his freedom
from contributory negligence; and when this burden of pleading and proving
the plaintiff's contributory negligence is on the defendant. While this state approach may be desirable in the pure diversity cases where rights created by the
respective states are being enforced, nevertheless it is considered that this is
a federal cause of action, and there should be uniformity, at least in these matters,
if not in the question of the standards of conduct required. The federal courts
have not hesitated to say that substantive statutes of limitation of the states do
not apply, and in the example used, the employment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as to pleading contributory negligence would approach the uniformity which it is felt is desirable. Other examples will be apparent to the reader
on an examination of the cases.
Aside from those matters which involve policy, it is hoped that the lawyer
who has a claim will be more aware of the pitfalls he will have to avoid such as
those in the election of remedies. Some of his problems have been solved, and he
can better advise his client now than two years ago as to the probability of recovery,
The amount of fee allowed the attorney is out of line with that prevailing in tort
142 U. S. v. Morrow, 182 F.2d 986 (C. A. D. C. 1950) (Virginia), Duff v. U. S., 171 F.2d 846
(C. A. 4th 1949 (Maryland).
148 Sartori v. U. S., 186 F.2d 679 (C. A. 10th 1950) (Montana), Carnes v. U. S., 186 F.2d 648
(C. A. loth 1950) (Alabama).
144 D'Anna v, U. S., 181 F.2d 335 (C. A. 4th 1950) (Maryland), San Diego Gas v. U. S., 173 F.2d
92 (C. A. 9th 1949) (California).
145 Carnes v. U. S., 172 F.2d 648 (C. A. 10th 1951).
146 Bushey v. U. S., 172 F.2d 447 (C. A. 2nd 1949).
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cases in most jurisdictions. It is hoped, however, that this will not serve as a deterrent in accepting worthy claims. From the volume of business under the Act any
fear on this score is apparently not well-founded.
One final observation is fitting. This is a splendid act from many viewpoints.
The general excellence of the decisions und-er the Act, both from the standpoint
of the results achieved and the careful analysis given to the points of interpretation
involved, sptaks volumes for the merits of our federal judiciary.

